What Matters: February 2004
One Way to Mars
Q&A with Joe Gavin '41, SM '42
In 1998, Joe Gavin '41, SM '42, former COO and president of Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. and former director of the Apollo Lunar Module Program, sent a proposal to Ed Crawley '76, SM '78, ScD '81 who was then the department chair for the aeronautics and astronautics department at MIT. This proposal called for a one-way manned mission to Mars.
Since that time, the notion of sending astronauts on a one-way mission to Mars has gained much support around the globe, although NASA has yet to even consider such a proposal.
The MIT Alumni Association recently had a chance to talk to Mr. Gavin about this proposal in light of NASA's current Mars programs as well as President Bush's pro-Mars strategy.
Your proposal suggests that we need more robotic missions to Mars like the Pathfinder mission (1997). How did this proposal come into being and how do the current missions of the Spirit and Opportunity rovers size-up? Also, what more do we need to do before sending humans to Mars?
The Apollo program was terminated leaving potentially interesting lunar exploration undone. Despite its success, this program was criticized in some quarters as "a huge expense to bring back a couple of bags of rocks." Many of the early Mars studies (patterned after Apollo) and especially the 1992 "90-day" study by NASA appeared very complex and many times more expensive than Apollo.
In looking at the mission segments and sequences with the purpose of finding a simpler solution—more likely to succeed and more likely to have a future—two steps came to mind. First, a far more extensive robotic exploration, with much larger, more capable, and longer range Rovers seems needed to determine if and when sending people makes sense. Then and only then would it be reasonable to send a manned mission to set up a base on Mars with the intent and commitment to stay as colonists.
How would we select a crew and what might be their qualifications?
Crew selection should probably focus on fit, mature individuals of various skills, possibly in their 50s with grown and established families. Appropriate incentives could be evolved. I think that there would be no lack of volunteers.
Does the technology exist to create a sustainable living apparatus for humans on Mars?
Yes, with prepositioned supplies and continuing periodic support. The support missions are divorced from basic mission success, have some flexibility in timing, and can be planned so that no one support mission is critical to the survival of the Mars base.
In your proposal, you recommend sending unmanned supply missions before and after launch as a method of not only properly supplying humans on the planet, but of cutting costs, as well. Wouldn't these additional missions just raise the bottom line even more? What financial realities could we learn from the Apollo mission in acquiring funds to support a manned Mars mission?
All the truly innovative projects undertaken since 1950 have clearly shown that it is impossible to estimate accurately the schedule and the cost. While schedule targets must be set, the program should be managed within an annual cost ceiling. The priorities should be mission success/safety, then schedule, then cost.
Note the annual cost ceiling above. The total cost would continue to increase with the longevity of the operation of the Mars base. Whether the Mars base is to grow more self-sufficient or whether it is eventually grown in size and numbers is probably beyond our ability to estimate.
Given President Bush's current pro-Mars policies, will your proposal finally make it into the hands of key decision makers at NASA or other space agencies? And, if so, what are the chances that it might be considered?
The current administration, most politicians, and many industrial leaders are so intent on the next month, the next quarter, or the next election that I see no likelihood that the one-way mission would have enough priority to gain serious consideration. I question whether the current policy makers really grasp the complexities of the announced future direction for NASA. I am not actively promoting my views; it would take a detailed study—perhaps needing 10 or 12 months' effort by a competent team to explore the potential for a one-way mission and its follow-up. Such a study might provide a convincing argument for this approach. A joint MIT, Draper, and industry team could do this.
To Mars—to stay
Joe Gavin's proposal for a one-way manned mission to Mars.
This study is based on the concept that a manned expedition to Mars should only be undertaken if it is intended that the participants stay on Mars—as colonists—to open a new frontier. Starting with this assumption leads to a completely different logic compared to many, if not all, prior studies concerning manned missions to the Red Planet.
A subsidiary assumption is that no manned mission makes sense until a thorough robotic survey has been made, accomplished by rovers having far greater range and capability than the successful but incredibly limited Pathfinder (1997). When, and if, it appears reasonable and desirable to send humans to Mars to stay, there follows a need to pre-locate an extensive tonnage of supplies at the proposed landing site. Launching such a mission also entails a long term commitment to continue sending supplies to the extent that development of Martian resources proves inadequate.
Why would this approach to the exploration and exploitation of Mars be considered attractive? A number of advantages appear inherent:
- There are fewer manned spacecraft to be designed, developed, and used.
- The mission requires fewer mode changes.
- There are not only fewer mode changes but also much less dormant time between modes.
- 1, 2, and 3 above suggest a higher probability of mission success.
- 1 suggests that peak year funding may be less.
- While long-term expenditures are entailed by the need for a continuing supply program, these activities are not directly involved in mission success because no single support mission is necessarily critical.
As compared to an Apollo style, round-trip mission, the approach proposed here avoids the criticism of huge peak expenditures and risks to "bring back a sack of rocks."
Comparisons are made to support this basic concept:
- The number of unique modules
- The number of mode changes
- The number of rendezvous and dockings
- The number of entries into planetary orbit
- The number of severity of atmospheric entries and landings
- The length of time (months) of dormancy for fuel and modules, etc.
Recommendations are made to quantify a reasonable robotic survey of mars to provide informed choice of landing site(s).
A review of contemporary launchers is made to determine desirable choices for unmanned supply missions.
An estimate of the proposed manned mission is made to size modules and boosters as well as to provide a first estimate of comparative costs and phasing of costs—one-way versus round-trip.
While the initial emphasis for the landing party must be to survive, long-term occupation of a Martian base offers the potential for scientific observations not possible any other way.
About the Author
Joseph G. Gavin earned SB and SM degrees in aeronautical engineering from MIT in 1941 and 1942, respectively. After military service during the war, he joined Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. where he worked for 39 years, including ten years as Director of the Lunar Module Program for Apollo. He retired from Grumman in 1985 after nine years as President and COO. In 1971 he received the NASA Distinguished Public Medal and was elected to the National Academy of Engineering in 1974. He is a life member of the MIT Corporation and lives in Amherst, Massachusetts, with his wife, Dorothy.
What Matters is a guest opinion column written by a different MIT alumnus or alumna. The views expressed are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Alumni Association or MIT. Interested in writing a column? Email whatmatters@mit.edu.
